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Why did Britain remove the population of an idyllic Indian Ocean archipelago? Why has Britain 
resisted granting citizenship to the inhabitants of another small island in the mid-Atlantic? Why 
does Britain still ‘own’ 90 square miles of Cyprus? The answer, we suggest, lies in part with the 
heritage of Bletchley Park, an obsession with informational dominance in world politics that 
demands the control of key nodes in international telecommunications around the globe. We also 
argue that intelligence studies has focused unduly on the human agent or the secret policeman 
and as a result, the issue of electronic imperialism has been a neglected aspect of intelligence 
collection across the Global South. Here we focus on Britain’s Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ) and suggest that computers, colonies and ocean cables enjoy strange and 
unexpected connections that can alter the fate of small nations. We conclude that perhaps 
geographers, rather than historians or political scientists, deploy the most advanced conceptual 
tools for examining this phenomenon.  
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In February 2019, the UK was ordered to hand back the Chagos Islands to Mauritius. The highest 
court of the United Nations ruled that continued British occupation of this remote Indian Ocean 
archipelago was illegal. It dwelled on the unhappy fate of the population of Diego Garcia, the 
largest of the islands.1 It is widely understood that at the time this island was separated from 
Mauritius, Britain was dishonest about the status of the indigenous population. In November 
1965, the Secretary of State for the Colonies assured Parliament that the islands chosen had 
virtually no permanent inhabitants and were well placed for communications in the Indian Ocean 
Area.2 Parliament was further misled over the nature of the base agreements reached with the 
United States. No mention was made of the key driver for this arrangement, the worldwide 
requirement by Britain and America for land bases to collect signals intelligence. Recognising this 
changes our understanding of the secret struggle for the Global South, offering a different view 
of the impact of espionage – one that focuses on boundaries, borders and the fate of territories 
- even entire populations. 
The history of the secret state in the Global South is increasingly well known. Extensively 
analysed by historians including David Anderson, Christopher Andrew, David Dilks, Bernard 
Porter, Priya Satia and Martin Thomas, connections between the intelligence and security 
services of Europe and their empires are recognized as important and complex. In many ways, 
the very origins of intelligence studies as a subject lies in the study of the Global South, with many 
of the founders of the discipline trained in commonwealth, colonial or imperial history. In that 
sense, the activities of empire enjoyed a welcome and early incorporation into the history of 
British intelligence and security agencies.3  
Traditionally focused on human intelligence, a romantic image accompanied the first 
accounts of clandestine activities in an imperial setting. Framed by wider ideas of irregular 
warfare and plucky amateurs, wistful figures like Evelyn Waugh, Orde Wingate and Lawrence of 
Arabia were never far away.4 Early intelligence activities lacked professionalism, reliant instead 
on an army of amateur geographers, tourists, consuls and adventurers to gather vitally important 
information for their customers.5 This trend continued long after the end of World War Two, with 
intelligence professionalism arguably growing only as the Empire plunged into retreat.6 Even in 
imperial decline, a romantic image persisted of enterprising amateurs and ‘unpaid men… doing 
it for the love of the thing.’7  
The ‘Ripping Yarns’ school of colonial intelligence history, bolstered by breathless trade 
press books, has been revised over the last ten years.8 Since 2005, the portrayal of imperial spies 
has taken on a more somber tone with volumes like The History of the Hanged and Britain’s Gulag 
revealing disturbing oppression during Britain’s post-war colonial counter-insurgencies such as 
Kenya.9 Here, Caroline Elkins used oral history while David Anderson pursued the documents 
trail, but both told the same story of barbed-wire villages and brutality. Most dramatically, this 
new wave was illuminated by fresh documents. The intelligence aspects of British imperialism 
are littered throughout the once-secret archive at Hanslope Park, only recently uncovered by the 
intrepid research of David Anderson. In 2011, British officials admitted that they had illegally held 
a vast archive of documents, removed from former colonies at the point of independence. This 
included files taken from thirty-seven countries between the late 1940s and the 1970s.10 The 
Kenya story has been paralleled by a re-examination of other episodes such as the Malayan 
Emergency in which the Special Branch are portrayed either as kind and crafty, or cunning and 
cruel.11  
Technological developments also impacted the fate of these remote colonial territories. 
As improvements in high frequency radio and satellites gained pace throughout the Cold War, 
intelligence collection was possible in different ways.12 Armed with more powerful, agile 
collection techniques, smaller numbers of traditional satellite farms could maintain the same 
levels of interception capability.13 Saving money, this new technical reality impacted the status 
and importance of these remote lands. Islands that were once central to the Anglo-American 
signals intelligence agenda became less important. Pelton writes extensively on this, drawing 
historians’ attention to the intersection between technology, Government and space.14 This 
article builds on these ideas, demonstrating the enduring importance of geography and 
technology to American and British security interests.  
Undoubtedly, over the last ten years we have achieved a real step forward in terms of our 
understanding of imperial intelligence and security. Yet serious distortions remain - the most 
important of which is the absence of much consideration of signals intelligence. A few historians 
have commented on the role of signals intelligence in post-imperial conflicts like Suez, Yemen or 
Vietnam.15 Others have pointed out the role of signals intelligence bases in America’s rise to 
globalism. As America rose to prominence, the remnants of the British Empire were attractive 
selling points within the trans-Atlantic partnership, allowing Britain to maintain an elevated 
international status far above her station. Overall, however, the imperial signals intelligence story 
is ignored in favour of a narrative composed of human agents. 16 
This imbalance weakens our understanding of the secret state and its relationship with 
the Global South in at least three ways. First, we ignore a vast colonial presence that had a 
technological texture. Whether we look at the hundreds of British listeners based in Cyprus in 
the 1960s, the Americans based at Kagnew in Ethiopia in the 1970s, or Russians based at Lourdes 
in Cuba in the 1980s, a hidden world of colonial existed with their own footprints and cultures 
that we need to consider.17 Second, because of an American-led scheme that began in the 1950s 
to weaken the Swiss cypher machines bought by countries across the Global South, signals 
intelligence was much more effective in places like the Middle East, Africa and Asia than in 
Europe. The West struggled to read Soviet codes and vice versa, but across much of the rest of 
the world, communications were largely an open book. Organisations like GCHQ and its American 
equivalent, the National Security Agency (NSA) read more than half the communications they 
collected. While most of this material is as yet unavailable, in years to come we will be able to 
see everything sent by Colonel Gadaffi and transcripts of all the phone calls made by Yasser Arafat 
- this will change international history significantly.18  
But there is a third sense in which signals intelligence shifts our view of the relationship 
between secret service and the Global South. The wider significance of intelligence within empire 
has often been seen through the prism of ‘declinism’ and the slow imperial retreat. Intelligence 
is interpreted as a force multiplier, enabling countries like Britain to conduct a game of delayed 
decolonization, sustaining some of the outworks of empire for longer than many thought 
possible. Historians like Rory Cormac and Calder Walton have seen intelligence as an answer to 
imperial over-stretch by allowing more efficient action and have portrayed covert action as a sort 
of Houdini-like trick for prime ministers attempting to escape colonial problems.19 While these 
arguments are compelling, they can sometimes reduce intelligence to a sub-set of the ‘fancy 
footwork’ school of imperial retreat. Historians like John Darwin and Wm. Roger Louis have 
argued that, as late as the 1970s, British officials had not given up the struggle to sustain empire 
and that it was instead recast as collaborations, condominiums, mandates and informal 
relationships. In other words, it is often argued that intelligence was a fixer employed to prolong 
the existence of empire.20  
Cold War historians have long ignored the ‘imperial effects’ of the Anglo-American 
alliance.21 Roger Louis and Robinson were first to identify this deficit, arguing that the history of 
the British Empire throughout the Cold War was closely connected to the Anglo-American 
strategic interests. Fearing her decline, Britain’s geo-strategists eagerly pursued ‘new sources of 
power overseas to redress the balance of the Old World.’22 Building on Roger Louis and 
Robinson’s ‘Imperialism of Decolonization,’ this article highlights examples of Britain’s 
geopolitical repositioning throughout the Cold War. Understood as military bases, the history of 
these remote islands is critically misunderstood.  
Here we seek to argue that in some cases the relationship was reversed: empire was often 
sustained in the service of intelligence. Once we take into account the vast physical complexes 
owned by signals intelligence in the Global South, it is clear that the value of these listening 
stations did much to motivate a persistent presence in places from which European colonists 
would otherwise have vanished. In the British case, which we explore here, close collaboration 
between diplomats and the military allowed GCHQ to run its own overseas empire throughout 
the Cold War. Some of this was an empire of occupation in places like Berlin where the Germans 
paid the costs of baroque constructions such as Teufelsberg or ‘Devils Mountain’.23 However, 
some of GCHQ’s largest facilities were scattered across the Middle East and Asia, not only helping 
to prolong Britain’s presence there, but also giving important additional reasons for Britain to 
remain in some vestigial form. In the 1950s and 1960s, a vast network of intercept stations ringed 
the globe, often disguised as military communications stations.  The largest British examples were 
at locations such as Pergamos in Cyprus, or Perkar in Ceylon. Panic over the possible loss of these 
imperial footholds triggered extraordinary responses during the 1960s. GCHQ experimented with 
a possible fleet of nuclear-powered ships that would replace its bases on Cyprus - with the newly 
independent states of Africa as their main targets. Britain also sought to create a curious colony 
without subjects in the British Indian Overseas Territories or ‘BIOT’ and the ramifications of this 
toxic experiment continue to reverberate in international courts half a century later.24  
 Meanwhile in Asia, signals intelligence was part of multiple over-lapping empires. Some 
British signals intelligence facilities were run jointly with Australia’s listeners, the Defence Signals 
Directorate (DSD), including Singapore and Hong Kong. Although there were combined GCHQ-
DSD operations, in the 1950s and 1960s, Britain behaved as a colonial hegemon managed DSD.25  
Like Cyprus, signals intelligence was an important reason to stay on in Hong Kong. The large RAF 
radar site at Tai Mo Shan in the New Territories provided strategically important information on 
the burgeoning Chinese Air Force for American Pacific Command, while other stations there gave 
important product to the growing American effort in Vietnam.26 The Anglo-Australian signals 
intelligence sites in Hong Kong were co-ordinated with another neo-colonial presence, the  
complex of NSA listening stations in Okinawa.27 
 A reconsideration of GCHQ’s secret signals intelligence empire also allows us to ask some 
questions about methods. Intelligence studies is no longer the atheoretical desert that it once 
was.28 Nevertheless, as we move the analytical lens towards intelligence and security agencies in 
the Global South, do we need new concepts and new methods? Despite the fact that historians 
working in intelligence studies are found as frequently in social science departments as they are 
in history departments, they have been slow to draw on some of the more exciting literature of 
IR, political geography and sociology around bases and borders that would arguably enhance our 
conceptual interpretation of intelligence. Geographers, rather than historians, have been active 
in asking the most pertinent questions about the prolonged pause in decolonization for small 
islands. The material answer can range from detention centers, to low-tax regimes, to military 
bases. Here we add one more item to the list - signals intelligence.29  We begin to explore some 





Sri Lanka and Suez 
Real and visible empire sometimes collided with GCHQ’s secret empire. In 1956, the Suez Crisis, 
perpetrated by dyspeptic and increasingly dysfunctional Anthony Eden, caused unexpected 
turbulence for British signals intelligence. It led directly to the eviction of GCHQ from some of its 
more valuable real estate in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. This was the first of a number of 
signals intelligence territorial crises which in turn caused waves of interception refugees to head for 
what remained of GCHQ’s outstations. Meanwhile, across the world, nationalist politicians 
protested and vented their anger against Britain’s chain of imperial bases.31  
 By December 1956, GCHQ was just opening a large and well equipped 'secret sigint station' 
covering the Indian Ocean at Perkar on Ceylon, which had been recently been constructed at the 
cost of close to £2 million (£35 million at 2019 prices). The Ceylonese government had wanted to 
free up access to the old signals intelligence site at HMS Anderson for urban re-development. The 
purpose of the new GCHQ site at Perkar was hidden from the Ceylonese, requiring Britain to 
generate a ‘cover story’. Much debate had taken place in London over whether to let the Ceylonese 
Prime Minister in on ‘the real function of Perkar’. GCHQ decided against candour, fearing ‘leakage’.32  
British officials were convinced that even at the new site 'the real purpose could be easily 
disguised'.33 
 Endless effort had gone into the Perkar site. As early as October 1951, Dr John Burrough 
from GCHQ was having regular meetings at the Admiralty to discuss the technical problems. It was 
hard to find a location which was not too remote and yet did not suffer from interference from 
urban transmissions. Even the ignition systems of cars on a busy highway up to 500 yards away could 
cause unacceptable interference. Because the British had persuaded Prime Minister Bandaranaike 
to allow Britain what were politely called 'certain facilities for communications' in perpetuity, there 
was a lot of investment. By 1955, with more money, the station had been upgraded to monitor 
signals traffic from 'all bearings' and boasted a vast aerial farm that covered more than 400 acres.34   
 Yet the Suez operation effectively destroyed this expensive new facility soon after it was 
completed. In 1956, the Ceylonese were incensed at Eden’s imperial escapade and believed the 
British had refuelled ships in Ceylon en route to the invasion of Egypt. They now demanded a 
schedule for the removal of all foreign bases without exception. The paint was barely dry on GCHQ’s 
vast new station at Perkar. The Treasury were aghast, adding that even a brief visit to Ceylon ‘brings 
home the complexity of these installations’ and ‘their vital importance’.  The sums of money 
invested in them were ‘substantial’. Officials came up with preposterous idea of using service 
personnel ‘wearing civilian clothes’ in the hope of assuaging the Ceylonese.35 But Bandaranaike 
stamped her foot, insisting that all the British, however attired, had to go. A compromise was 
agreed: 'The GCHQ station can be given up entirely, but we should like to keep it in operation for 
five years.' Accordingly, the new GCHQ site at Perkar, completed in late 1956, operated only until 
1962, whereupon it was closed.36 GCHQ had been evicted from its premier site in the Indian Ocean 
and was already looking for a new home in the region.37     
 GCHQ also felt the reverberations of Suez elsewhere. In Iraq, Britain enjoyed a good 
relationship with the ruler King Faisal. As a result, the British had been allowed to retain a number 
of bases. One of these was RAF Habbaniya, not far from Baghdad. Superficially this looked like so 
many military aerodromes in the Middle East, but in fact it housed 123 Signals Squadron, which ran 
a large signals intelligence monitoring station. Airborne signals intelligence flights from Habbaniya 
crossed into Iran, and then loitered over the Caspian Sea, collecting signals from Soviet missile 
testing sites. However, as a result of Suez, Faisal’s political situation deteriorated rapidly with pro-
Nasser uprisings in the cities of Najaf and Hayy. Iraq’s membership of the Baghdad Pact, a British-
managed military alliance, only exacerbated popular hatred of the regime. Then, in the summer of 
1958, King Faisal’s ally, King Hussein of Jordan, asked for military assistance during a growing crisis 
in the Lebanon. The Iraqi army put together an expeditionary force to help, but in the early hours of 
14 July 1958, the assembled Iraqi column turned against its own supreme commander, marched 
right into Bagdad and carried out a coup in which the king was killed.38 Fortunately for Jordan, GCHQ 
intercepts of Egyptian diplomatic traffic gave precise information about Nasser’s parallel plots 
against the neighbouring King of Jordan a few days later, prompting timely British support for the 
beleaguered monarch. Harold Macmillan recorded the importance of GCHQ’s ‘intercepts’ to the 





In 1958, signals intelligence specialists evicted from Iraq were busy retreating to Cyprus, which was 
now GCHQ’s refugee camp. There had been several waves of GCHQ resettlement. Immediately after 
the Second World War, Britain had enjoyed numerous interception stations in the Middle East. The 
most important was at Heliopolis in Egypt which boasted many civilian operators, serving as the 
main MI6 communications centre, absorbing much of the region’s diplomatic traffic. The Army ran 
its own intercept station at Sarafand in Palestine, while the RAF, as we have seen, boasted a large 
intercept station at RAF Habbaniya in Iraq. There were undercover listening stations buried within 
consulates in places such as Istanbul. By the 1950s, Britain had also developed covert sites in 
northern Iran that were focused on Russia. However, the British Empire in the Middle East consisted 
of very few formal colonies and had long been an agglomeration of mandates, shaky treaty 
relationships and uncertain base rights granted by royalist regimes. Accordingly, British signals 
intelligence gradually fell back towards its last proper colonial foothold, the island of Cyprus.       
As a result, by the late 1950s, Cyprus was increasingly the home for every kind of secret radio 
activity in the Middle East. This included not only a growing monopoly of Britain’s monitoring assets 
but also the collection sites of the US Foreign Broadcast Information Service which listened into 
overt news broadcasts around the world. In addition, Cyprus offered a safe haven for Britain’s overt 
and covert propaganda broadcasting in the region. These mushroomed during the premiership of 
Anthony Eden who nurtured a special hatred of Egypt’s nationalist leader, General Gamel Abdul 
Nasser, and who urged a reduction of British radio propaganda directed at the Russians in favour of 
targeting Nasser.40  As early as 1954, Eden insisted that a new broadcasting station in Aden covering 
Iraq and Syria was to receive 'first priority', since Nasser’s own radio station, ‘The Voice of Egypt’, 
was busily pouring out its own vitriolic message.41 Britain’s main radio weapon against Nasser was 
the SIS-owned station in Cyprus, Sharq el-Adna.42  
 The signals intelligence intercepts from the 1950s remain classified, however we have a 
general idea of their value. After the Suez Crisis, Selwyn Lloyd, Eden’s Foreign Secretary, wrote to 
Eric Jones, the Director of GCHQ, congratulating him on the volume of Middle East intelligence that 
signals intelligence had provided during Suez, particularly subsequent to the seizure of the canal. 'I 
have observed the volume of material which has been produced by G.C.H.Q. relating to all the 
countries in the Middle East area', suggesting that the traffic of many countries was being read. 
Lloyd added 'I am writing to let you know how valuable we have found this material and how much 
I appreciate the hard work and skill involved in its production'.43 GCHQ read much of Cairo’s 
diplomatic traffic with key embassies in the region during the mid-1950s, including Amman and 
Damascus. It also read traffic between Cairo and Egypt’s London Embassy.44  
But by 1958, in the backwash of Suez, over a thousand listeners found themselves in the 
tented encampment at RAF Pergamos in Cyprus.45 A special signals unit was already there and the 
forty-three acre site was already dominated by aerials, but the refugees from Habbaniya 
represented a further unscheduled expansion.46 Together with the Army station run by what would 
become 9 Signals Regiment at Ayios Nikolaos, these now constituted the key signals intelligence 
stations in the region. Further west, there was a British signals intelligence station at Dingli in Malta 
with 230 staff, together with a few dozen souls at Ascension Island and Gibraltar. However, Cyprus 
was the leviathan.47 Negotiations over the exact extent of the Sovereign Base Areas on Cyprus were 
ongoing, but here, at least for the time being, relations with the authorities in Cyprus were relatively 
cordial. Negotiations over the Cyprus Sovereign Base Areas came to climax in 1959. The British 
delegation, led by Julian Amery, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, and also an old covert 
action stager, started with an extravagant bid for some 400 square miles of territory, but Amery  
eventually settled for 99 square miles.48   
 By the early 1960s, the main problem on Cyprus was an ongoing insurgency by the EOKA 
guerrillas who wanted unification with Greece. Matters were made worse by the intense divisions 
between the Greek and Turkish communities. As a result, ‘the special problem of the security of the 
two SIGINT stations’ dictated a minimum land force garrison including a heavy RAF Regiment 
presence. GCHQ’s aerial farms were also extensive and vulnerable to sabotage. Once the Chiefs of 
Staff had accepted that the two major bases at Episkopi and Dhekelia ‘must be retained because of 
the SIGINT facilities’, then other things surely followed. Typically, the RAF decided to keep its main 
regional stockpile of nuclear weapons, codenamed ‘Tuxedo’ at Dhekelia. In other words, while the 
Cyprus garrison was not there solely for signals intelligence, the signals intelligence facilities tended 
to be the driver, since they alone were irreplaceable.49  The periodic outbreaks of inter-communal 
strife led to questions from the Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas Home, who served briefly after 
Harold Macmillan. In December 1963, he asked whether Britain really still needed bases in Cyprus? 
Peter Thorneycroft, the Defence Secretary, responded with an unqualified ‘yes’. He explained that 
Cyprus ‘houses most important SIGINT stations and it also provided a base from which special 
reconnaissance flights are carried out’. Thorneycroft explained that while most of these activities 
could be re-located, intelligence was the sticking point, since it was ‘not considered that SIGINT 
facilities could be adequately replaced elsewhere’.50 The arrival of a UN peacekeeping force on 
Cyprus in 1964 eventually stabilised the situation. The importance of GCHQ’s work in the Middle 
East was re-affirmed by the Yemen Civil War between 1962 and 1965 in which Nasser intervened.51 
GCHQ did not take their bases in Cyprus for granted. The war against the EOKA guerrillas had 
prompted them to look for alternatives.52 In the early 1960s, partly as a result of conversations 
with the Americans, GCHQ decided that it would spread the risk by creating a dedicated ‘Sigint 
Ship’. The American had enjoyed success by repurposing old cargo vessels which they anchored 
off Cuba to listen in during the Cuban Missile Crisis. But GCHQ planned to go one better with a 
vessel that was purpose built with ‘special technical facilities’, in contrast to the American’s 
elderly converted transports. The cover-name chosen for this exciting new project was the 
‘Communications Trials Ship’. The Permanent Secretaries Committee on the Intelligence Services 
(PSIS) approved the construction of the first ship on 19 July 1965 and wanted a fully fitted out 
ship by the summer of 1969, allowing time for trials in the autumn. The ship was to enter service 
in early 1970. There were hopes for two further atomic-powered ships in the same class. But 
budget restraints and calamities with the American ships eventually terminated the British 
project.53  
 Surprisingly, by 1974, the main threat to the Cyprus signals intelligence sites came from 
London. During July 1974, officials agonised over what to do about Cyprus in the long-term. Two 
problems now converged. First, the ‘sprawling’ nature of the signals intelligence sites on Cyprus 
needed vast aerial farms, making them hard to defend during periodic inter-communal violence. 
Second, the increasing troop requirements generated by the growing troubles in Northern Ireland 
meant that strategic reserve earmarked to reinforce Cyprus in a crisis was depleted. In short, there 
was no longer a ‘fire brigade’ to come to the rescue in a future crisis.54 All this coincided with a major 
Defence Review in 1974, begun by Harold Wilson, reflecting the dire state of the British economy.  
Cabinet ministers decided that British forces should be withdrawn completely from Cyprus as soon 
as the political situation permitted. Harold Wilson’s objective was to withdraw from Cyprus by 31 
March 1976, saving some £60 million. However, senior officials, including the Cabinet Secretary John 
Hunt, knew that the Americans would be upset. They warned that Washington ‘will press us hard 
not to withdraw from Cyprus’ adding that the ‘American Intelligence Community is a powerful lobby 
in Washington’ and that ‘our eventual decisions on Cyprus may affect not only the continuance of 
the present valuable Anglo-American intelligence relationship but also the general American 
reaction to our overall Defence Review proposals.’55 
 Harold Wilson pressed on with his decision to leave Cyprus and so Sir John Hunt, the Cabinet 
Secretary, travelled to Washington to break the bad news as gently as possible. On 12 November 
1974, Hunt met privately with Henry Kissinger, James Schlesinger and William Colby. The meeting 
did not go well and Kissinger’s reaction was explosive, evoking a remarkable stream of expletives.56 
Indeed the Americans ‘reacted so strongly’ that the British decision was put on hold.57 Kissinger was 
worried about the loss of the intelligence bases, and also thought British withdrawal would have a 
destabilising effect on the region. Kissinger emphasised that he was determined that the British 
‘continue to occupy this square on the world chess board’. London insisted that their own preferred 
policy was ‘complete British military withdrawal from Cyprus’ but eventually accepted a subsidy, 
‘given the global importance of working closely with the Americans’.58 In 1977, Jim Callaghan, 
Wilson’s successor, formally assured the Americans that ‘we shall not in the present circumstances 
proceed with our preferred policy of withdrawing from the Sovereign Base Area altogether’. 59  It is 
not unlikely that GCHQ and the Cabinet Secretary were involved in an audacious game of poker with 
the Americans – all along the objective being to persuade the Americans to pay for Cyprus.60  
 The American willingness to pay towards the costs of bases on Cyprus was connected to the 
steep deterioration of America’s relations with Turkey during the invasion. Turkey represented 
NSA’s own signals intelligence empire in the Middle East. In 1974, Ankara had expected Washington 
to put pressure on Athens to stop the coup attempt against Makarios. Kissinger had not done this 
and instead, once the Turkish invasion of Cyprus began, the United States suspended military 
assistance to Turkey. Ankara already nurtured some resentment over previous American efforts to 
deter a Turkish invasion of Cyprus some ten years earlier. The Turks now retaliated by closing down 
the vast complex of American bases that sprawled across the country. At a stroke, the United States 
lost the use of numerous intelligence-gathering facilities which had costs tens of millions of dollars 
to create and which had been staffed by literally thousands of operatives. This was an earthquake 
in the signals intelligence world and the net result was that NSA was now more dependent on 
Cyprus.61 Kissinger regarded the loss of the Turkish bases as nothing short of ‘a disaster’.62 For 







GCHQ’s most important outpost in Asia was Hong Kong - the Cyprus of the east. The British colony 
of Hong Kong was of special value to the United States. This reflected the fact that, from the end of 
the Chinese Civil War that brought Mao Tse-tung to power in 1949, the United States did not even 
have an embassy in mainland China or in North Vietnam.63 ‘Hong Kong became an American 
watchtower on China’ recalls Jack Smith, who superintended the Far East in the CIA’s Office of 
National Estimates.64 GCHQ joined with the Americans and the equivalent Australian organisation, 
Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), to develop the facilities in Hong Kong. Washington received the 
full intercept output of Hong Kong which did 'not duplicate US effort', but with the onset of the 
Korean War, demands for intelligence went up sharply and Washington considered that combined 
US-UK intercept facilities in Far East were 'far short of requirements'.65 In July 1952, the US 
Communications Intelligence Board, persuaded its British opposite numbers of the 'urgent need' to 
send a large US Air Force signals intelligence unit to Hong Kong to join the hard-pressed British and 
Australians. However, their arrival was thwarted by the Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Alexander 
Grantham, who detested the way in which his territory had become host to a myriad of espionage 
activities.66  
 Even in 1955, the United States was still negotiating for new sites in Asia. These were not 
small or discreet, requiring vast acres of antennae known as 'aerial farms', to capture signals. In 
Taiwan, American officials had run into trouble securing a desired 335-acre site near Nan-Szu-Pu 
airfield where they had plans to locate 300 personnel from the Army Security Agency.67 With 
repeated clashes over the Taiwan Straits in the late 1950s, the British government reviewed the 
future of Hong Kong. The lease on the New Territories was due to expire in 1997 and clearly, they 
noted, Hong Kong could not survive as a colony beyond that date. Meanwhile, officials pondered 
the short-term value of the continued British presence in Hong Kong: ‘The sole military advantage 
that we derive from Hong Kong is that of intelligence: from the colony close observation of events 
in the Chinese People’s Republic is possible. Hong Kong is probably indefensible against an all-out 
attack: the possibility of its defence using nuclear weapons is at present the subject of a special 
study. Such action could easily extend conflict and lead to general war: the West might well decide 
that danger to Hong Kong was not worth this risk.’ Clearly, much turned on the quid pro quo involved 
in Anglo-American-Commonwealth axis of signals intelligence.68    
 Alongside GCHQ activities sat vast British and American programmes in Hong Kong, running 
agents and ‘wringing out’ defectors. During the 1950s and 1960s, both the State Department and 
the Pentagon considered Hong Kong to be the single most important British overseas territory from 
the point of view of intelligence gathering.69 In order to stimulate more defectors from China to 
Hong Kong, Britain launched ‘Operation Debenture’ in 1954. This was a covert radio project and 
constituted ‘the first UK operations of any magnitude for the penetration of Mainland China’. The 
aim was to provide a black broadcasting station that would increase the desire for contacts with the 
West amongst the Chinese middle classes and would also increase defections across the border into 
Hong Kong.70 Alongside this, SIS ran a significant operation designed to recruit Russian merchant 
seaman arriving in the port.71  
 During the Cold War, British diplomats often complained that Britain was collecting more 
intelligence about China than it could possibly need, and had asked why this target was so 
important? The underlying rationale was exchange with the Americans. Hong Kong was the single 
most valuable British collection station to NSA, providing offset in an otherwise unbalanced 
Anglo–American intelligence relationship. Notwithstanding the fact that NSA knew the British 
would have to leave in 1997, it had poured huge investment into British signals intelligence at 
Hong Kong. In 1982 the GCHQ station at Little Sai Wan, which had depended on listeners with 
headphones, had been closed down and replaced by a new operation at Chum Hom Kok, on the 
south side of the island, which monitored satellite activity. This new station was initially given 
the code name ‘Demos-1’. The problem with the location was accommodating the massive dishes 
– there were eventually five – on what was a narrow shelf of rock overlooking the South China 
Sea. A further programme codenamed ‘Demos-4’ provided yet more enormous dishes to capture 
civil traffic from China’s growing network of communications satellites, and also telemetry from 
missile tests.72 
When the Chum Hom Kok station was finished, John Adye, who became Director of GCHQ 
in 1989, wrote to the site engineers praising their efforts. He conveyed GCHQ’s sincere thanks to 
all who had contributed to a project on which ‘a great deal depended’. The investment was repaid 
with excellent intercepts of Chinese military traffic that revealed, for instance, Beijing’s thinking 
around the time of the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989. Yet even while this new station 
was being completed, the British were reminding NSA that their time on Hong Kong was running 
out. NSA had suggested that Britain should try to keep control of the Commander British Forces 
HQ building in Hong Kong even after handover, because it was by far the best medium-wave 
signals intelligence collection site in the territory. However, despite concerted pressure from the 
Americans, the British were ‘unenthusiastic’ about this idea. NSA and GCHQ had already begun 
to ponder future alternative sites. William Odom, Director of NSA in the late 1980s, noted in his 
ever-present daily logbook: ‘Hong Kong – where to move our gear?’73  
At midnight on 1 July 1997 the colony of Hong Kong was finally returned to China, 
signalling the end of Britain’s ninety-nine year lease on the New Territories. All the intercept 
equipment had already been moved to Geraldton, a DSD site in Western Australia. It was hoped 
that the loss of interception from Hong Kong would be partly offset by a sophisticated monitoring 
operation against the new Chinese Embassy in Canberra. The West had devoted enormous 
attention to state-of-the-art signals intelligence collection of this new diplomatic complex, and 
the resulting intelligence ‘take’ was so great that there were often thirty transcribers in the 
Australian capital processing it, a miniature version of the team recruited to translate the Berlin 
tunnel material in the 1950s. Secret collection from the Chinese Embassy included not only 
sound, but even video. This opened a priceless window on Chinese communications, which had 
always been hard to break. However, the duration of this operation was short, and to the fury of 





Foreign bases were symbols of ugly foreign imperialism, even in countries with no recent colonial 
past. During the late 1960s, dramatic events across the Global South showed the British and the 
Americans that they were likely to continue to lose key bases. Whether owned by the British or 
the Americans, overseas bases were easy targets for nationalist politicians. As early as May 1964, 
the US National Security Council had reviewed the problem of ‘politically unstable or unreliable 
countries’ in which the Americans had ‘intelligence installations’. The list was long and included 
Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, Ethiopia, Libya, Kenya, Morocco, India and Pakistan.74 However, in the 
Indian Ocean, the British seemed to have come up with a novel plan to sidestep these problems. 
Here they sought to create an Anglo-American base in a country without any indigenous people. 
Britain persuaded Mauritius and the Seychelles to detach a string of small islands in the Indian 
Ocean known as the Chagos in order to create a new sovereign area to be called the British Indian 
Ocean Territories or ‘BIOT’. The fly in the ointment was that, in reality, there was a small 
indigenous population and so the plan called for their enforced removal to Mauritius. What had 
seemed like a good idea slowly turned into a source of grave embarrassment.75 
The tiny island of Diego Garcia was the focus.  In August 1963, the Americans made a 
request to the British for ‘permission to look into the possibilities of setting up a rather large 
communications facility on the island of Diego Garcia.’76 While military and navy facilities were 
also mentioned, the urgent priority was for a communications base, requiring 3,000 acres and 
accommodation for 300 men. The British noted that Washington’s ‘immediate interest’ was ‘the 
development of a communications facility, for which they already have fiscal approval.’77  They 
added that ‘if Gan were to be denied to us, Diego Garcia would be the best location for strategic 
communications relay facilities… it is also suitable for the possible for the re-provision of our 
strategic wireless station at present working in Mauritius. In addition, Diego Garcia has been 
earmarked as a possible site for one of a chain of three radio navigational aids in the Indian 
Ocean.’78 This is an important document since it underlines how signals intelligence and 
communications drove the initial the acquisition and maintenance of Diego Garcia and the British 
Indian Overseas Territories (BIOTs). While broader military and navy facilities came later, archives 
reveal that intelligence capabilities were driving events.  
In December 1966, an agreement was finally reached and a ‘communication station’ was 
built at Diego Garcia in late 1970. The original intention was that Britain would meet the cost of 
‘resettling the inhabitants’ and ‘buying the agreement of Mauritius and the Seychelles’. 
Meanwhile the Americans would pay for the installations. However, as time went on it became 
clear that ‘the sweetener’ demanded by Mauritius and Seychelles to give up the islands was 
larger than expected, in the region of £10 million. British Ministers decided that Washington 
should contribute to this and American defence officials reluctantly agreed, only on condition 
that its neo-colonial activity could be hidden. This was done secretly by deducting the sum from 
money that Britain owed America for the cost of buying Polaris missiles.79 By the following year 
a full financial agreement had been drawn up stating that the United States would ‘forego the 
R&D surcharge to the extent of $14 million’.80  
Diego Garcia also represents a fascinating case of empire by proxy. American defence 
officials knew that Congress would not approve of America subsidising the ‘separation of the 
Chagos archipelago’ to create a new British colony. Indeed, British Treasury officials seemed to 
enjoy the discomfort of their allies at imperial entanglement and noted ‘there is plenty of reason 
for embarrassment’.81 If anyone asked whether there had been any American financial 
contribution they were to say that ‘no payment had been made by the US Government’.82 In April 
1967, Robert Sykes in the Foreign Office noted that ‘in view of the extreme delicacy of this 
subject’ the circulation of papers was being ‘kept to the absolute minimum’. Nevertheless, he 
reported that the Americans were increasingly nervous about telling what was ‘frankly an 
outright lie’.83    
The Americans were soon requesting further expansion. This was partly about basing 
conventional military forces for possible intervention in the Gulf but it was also linked to another 
signals intelligence episode in East Africa. During the Second World War, the British had given 
the Americans permission to build a signals intelligence station at Kagnew in Ethiopia. By March 
1951 there were over 1,312 staff at Kagnew providing what Ralph Canine, the Director of NSA, 
described as ‘unique and profitable intercept coverage’.84 Some of the work at Kagnew was 
focused on the Soviets, but it also collected manual morse from much of Africa and the Middle 
East. This was especially valuable during the Congo crisis of 1960 when the different factions 
fought for control over the province of Katanga. During its height, Kagnew sprawled over some 
3,400 acres and boasted some 5,000 personnel with the facilities of a small town including tennis 
courts and swimming pools.  However, by 1969 this ideal spot for signals intelligence collection 
was threatened by growing fighting between the Ethiopian military who were supported by the 
Americans, and the rebel Eritrean Liberation Front, who were backed by Damascus and the 
Soviets.85 By 1972 there were only 900 personnel and by 1974 there was simply a relay station 
for nuclear submarine communications with a little over a hundred people. Two kidnapping 
episodes in 1975 helped accelerate final closure in 1977.86 
 Diego Garcia’s vast base helped to replace the vital Kagnew signals intelligence station. In 
June 1973, American officials in London explained to the British that they had been forced ‘to 
reduce certain activities conducted by the US Army at Kagnew Station, Asmara’ and the ‘most 
practical solution’ would be the ‘enlargement of the Diego Garcia facility’. This would restore 
‘coverage in Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea and Western Indian Ocean, where Kagnew phase-out 
would have caused temporary degradation’ to signals intelligence operations.87 The cost of Diego 
Garcia now doubled. Part of this increased cost was a signals intelligence system designed to 
track Soviet submarines. The British were taken aback at this ‘very considerable’ expansion of 
the facilities.88 The American trump card was ongoing American support for the Britain’s own 
nuclear strategic submarines.89  
 Confrontation over intelligence and bases between Heath and Kissinger in late 1973 
almost destroyed the deal. The hot question was whether the Americans would be given what 
they called ‘unrestricted access’ to the base at Diego Garcia in a crisis.90 Having seen Heath limit 
American access to bases in both Cyprus and Britain during the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, 
Washington was wary. Yet Heath wanted precisely these sorts of restrictions on Diego Garcia. On 
10 January 1974, the Cabinet Secretary, John Hunt, warned Heath that: ‘This will not be easy’.91  
Three weeks later it was a hapless John Hunt who was sent on a special mission to the White 
House to find an agreed formula. The solution was a remarkable one. Publicly, the position would 
be ‘joint decision’ on use of the bases in a crisis, seemingly retaining the British veto. However, 
behind the scenes, there would also be a highly secret exchange of letters between Heath and 
Nixon that effectively changed this to mere consultation. Sure enough, on 5 February, Heath 
wrote a carefully crafted letter to Nixon assuring him of this ‘on a very personal basis’. ‘These 
understandings are agreeable to me’ replied Nixon.92 The exchange of letters was intensely 
secret. The British Embassy assured London that it was being handled ‘very restrictively indeed 
in the White House’.93  
 The deals over Diego Garcia shows how a ruthless requirement for bases has impacted 
on the wider fabric of the international system.  However, in Diego Garcia the effect was 
especially stark, translating into a Canute-like resistance to the end of empire and the cruel 
deportation of a small island population. This was surely one of the more dismal episodes in 
recent British history. Many of the deportees were second or third generation islanders, for 
whom Diego Garcia was their rightful home. Ahead lay years of legal battles as the indigenous 
islanders attempted – unsuccessfully – to escape forced resettlement and achieve the right to 
return.94  
In February 2019, the International Court of Justice declared Britain’s decolonization of 
the Chagos Islands unlawful.95 Doing so, the decision focused light on one of the most 
controversial and significant aspects of Western policies towards the Global South during the 
Cold War. Once more, detail of the British Indian Overseas Territories appeared on the front 
pages and Britain’s hidden secret state was laid bare.96 They are often presented as military 
installations but above all they are intelligence outposts.97  Information dominance and signals 
intelligence collection were the core drivers of US power through military bases across Latin 






Ascension – another BIOT? 
Ascension Island is an isolated volcanic island in the equatorial waters of the South Atlantic 
Ocean, around 1,000 miles off the coast of Africa and 1,400 miles from Brazil. In short, it is about 
midway between South America and Africa. Sustained inhabitation of Ascension Island started in 
1815, when British garrisoned the island while Napoleon was imprisoned on neighbouring Saint 
Helena. In 1836, Charles Darwin visited Ascension during his famous voyage on HMS Beagle. 
During  the Second World War, the United States operated a large airbase there called 
‘Wideawake’. The island rose briefly to public notice once more during the Falklands campaign 
when it formed the staging post for the extended operations of the UK Task Force.99  
 In 1960, the British Navy was operating a listening station on Ascension Island as part of 
its contribution to GCHQ’s intercept arm, the Composite Signals Organisation. Like all these 
stations, it was administratively controlled by the Admiralty’s Signals Division, but in reality, it 
was ‘operationally tasked by Government Communications Headquarters’. However, by late 
1963, the Navy had run into serious problems with personnel shortages. GCHQ directed that the 
station should be taken over by a detachment from 399 Signals Unit at RAF Digby.  This was a 
short term stop-gap since GCHQ had built and established ‘a permanent civilian manned station’ 
at Ascension Island by 1966. Operational communications were provided by Cable and Wireless 
who allowed their terminal at Ascension to be ‘patched’ to GCHQ for six hours daily to allow the 
signals intelligence  ‘take’ of the previous twenty-four hours to be sent in to Cheltenham.100 New 
facilities were constructed for both GCHQ and the BBC World Service, and for a while officials 
even considered going in with the Americans on an experimental nuclear power station there 
which would have powered all the defence facilities on the island.101  
In mid-1968, the Americans approached the British for broader operating rights at their 
airbase on Ascension Island. American officials were cautious since, they were already pushing 
the British for a larger base at Diego Garcia. Nevertheless, in ‘the intelligence area’ they noted 
‘the increased activities of the Soviet fleet in the South Atlantic was likely to require more and 
more intelligence collection flights and Ascension looked like a good place from which to obtain 
telemetry intelligence on missiles. Furthermore, there was the issue of monitoring increased 
communications by satellite. ‘All in all’ they continued ‘it would be nice if we could consider 
Ascension island as being unconditionally available for our use – in effect another BIOT’.102 These 
plans were eventually given the improbable local cover of a NASA space operation. During the 
1970s, in parallel with GCHQ’s successful site at Bude in Cornwall, Ascension covered the Atlantic 
Intelsat's Southern Hemisphere communications.103 
The analogy that the Americans made to ‘BIOT’ or Diego Garcia was uncannily accurate. 
Ascension nurtured a small but plucky long-term population that was repeatedly asking for 
citizenship rights and representation. In 2003, Robin Cook, Labour’s long-serving Foreign 
Secretary, promised a new deal for the residents of Ascension, including plans for democratic 
institutions, a legal right of abode and to own property. The idea was that Ascension would 
become a viable community focused on eco-tourism. However, in 2006, his successor Jack Straw, 
abandoned the idea of self-rule and the assumption is that Ascension is now destined to become 
another BIOT. Permanent residents are discouraged and the inhabitants are increasingly contract 
workers. GCHQ still operates a signals interception facility on Ascension while NASA continues to 
list Ascension Island as a “down range site” used for range safety instrumentation. Remarkably, 
in 2008, British diplomats approached the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf and requested sovereignty over 77,220 square miles of submarine territory 
around the island. As John Darwin has suggested, perhaps idea that the British empire is always 






In the second decade of the twenty-first century, Britain’s commitment to signals intelligence 
collection remains as strong as ever. In June 2013, many details of Britain’s electronic surveillance 
programme were leaked by Edward Snowden to The Guardian. The newspaper published some 
of Snowden’s documents but held back others, including reports that the UK tapped into a 
mammoth web of underwater fibre-optic cables in the Gulf from three secret bases in Oman. 
Although initially suppressed, these details were eventually published by the investigative 
journalist and long-term GCHQ watcher Duncan Campbell in the computer magazine, The 
Register.  
 Part of an operation codenamed ‘CIRCUIT,’ these three overseas processing centres act 
as vast data collection hubs. The three GCHQ sites in Oman are codenamed 'Timpani', 'Guitar' 
and ‘Clarinet’. Located on the northern coast of Oman at Seeb, undersea cables are exploited, 
spanning the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian Gulf, these carry much of the traffic from locations 
such as Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and even India. The bases are not British territory but are located 
in a sovereign state. Nevertheless, Oman’s ruler, Sultan Qaboos is somewhat indebted to Britain. 
One of the longest serving autocrats, he gained power as the result of a British-managed coup in 
1970. British military advisers in Oman, including the SAS, planned the removal of his father.105  
Arguably, the revelations about bases on the coast of Oman point us towards something 
else beyond specific colonial outposts. The pursuit of ever-greater intelligence capabilities by 
GCHQ has resulted in a shift away from perpetual empire towards the exploitation of the world’s 
oceans. Offering almost unlimited points of access, tapping into fibre-optic cables overcomes 
potentially problematic areas of ‘boundaries’ and ‘sovereignty.’ Simultaneously this evokes a 
nineteenth century past, when submarine telegraph cables were important, dominated by Cable 
and Wireless, and a future wherein oceans may be more important than the land for intelligence 
collection and information dominance.  
 Trevor Paglen is perhaps the most famous researcher to identify the strategic importance 
of underwater cables. His 2016 ‘Deep Web Dive’ project argues the internet has become ‘the 
greatest instrument of mass surveillance in human history’. Obscured by romantic metaphors of 
‘clouds’ and cyber’s ‘dark space,’ Paglen draws attention to the tapestry of industrial 
infrastructure that monitor and control 21st Century societies.106 For Paglen, such ‘infrastructures 
of power’ are deliberately coded and concealed by intelligence agencies through romantic 
metaphors, seldom recognised by their subjects as material things inhabiting the earth, oceans 
and skies. ‘The Cloud is buildings with servers in them.’107 Ultimately, the internet of 2018 is 
comprised of fibre-optic cables, both on land and increasingly under the sea. Tapping into these 
cables in the pursuit of information, knowledge and power is a strategic priority for the major 
intelligence agencies. Laying the blame firmly at the feet of GCHQ and NSA, Paglen explores how 
surveillance and a commitment to intelligence collection is geographically ‘everywhere and 
nowhere at the same time.’108  
Much has been written in the last five years on the impact of the internet on the tension 
between an individual’s right to privacy and the state’s defense of national security, but there 
has been little reflections on its meaning for the global south. Countries in Africa and Latin 
America are arguably even more dependent on mobiles phones and the internet for their 
infrastructure. Typically, banking has leapt several generations of technology and now resides 
increasingly on the Internet in developing countries. These countries are benefiting from 
advances in telecommunications but equally they are especially vulnerable to large-scale 
intelligence collection and subversion by the north. Signals intelligence has become an extension 
of an unequal world information order.109 Castells comments connectivity spawns ‘unevenly 
connected networks, typically benefiting the wealthy at the expensive of marginalised social 
groups.110 
There are continuities between the geographies of old empire of GCHQ and the new. Both 
are barely visible. Starosielski notes that undersea cables worldwide rarely enter public 
discourses,111 and when they do, they only add to narratives that obscure the significance of the 
infrastructure. She argues that these common narratives support the hidden nature of the 
networks, because they present cables as isolated, lost in both public spaces, and media 
narratives.112 Historically, undersea cable networks carrying global communications have been 
deliberately hidden from public view, insulated against both physical and intelligence-based 
threats, since they are so crucial to the operation of society.113 She focuses on the critical 
connection between the physical media infrastructure of New Zealand’s Southern Cross Cable, 
and its social, political and local environment. The cable has significance in the global political 
environment, and becomes a symbol (physical and metaphorical) of how power is linked with 
visibility. As Starosielski notes, these undersea communication cables are critical infrastructures 
which underpin our entire global society. 
 Political geographers emphasise the strategic importance of these obscure gears of 
statecraft. Barney Warf describes fibre optics as the ‘nervous system of the global economy.’114 
Delivering vast volumes of information across the world at light speed, Warf explores how fibre 
optics represent the most significant way human beings have ‘engineered the Earth’s surface’ for 
our advantage. Reimagining global spatiality, cables and infrastructure reinforce dependences 
between the globe’s inhabitants. Military bases, remote islands and signals intelligence facilities 
are prime examples, extending tentacles of Western Imperial influence tentacles throughout the 
Global South. 
 Practitioners are increasingly open about the importance of ocean networks. Former 
British diplomat John Sheldon is one example, arguing that geopolitics and geography remain 
central pillars of cyber power, which requires real footholds in real space to gain traction.115 John 
R Mills (former Pentagon and Department of State official) argues along similar lines, explaining 
the reliance of the US Government on undersea cables. Encircling the earth with copper and now 
fibre, ‘these cables display one of the most distinct physical manifestations of cyber.’116 Both of 
these interventions are significant, written by former senior practitioners on both sides of the 
Transatlantic. Intelligence historians should perhaps pay more attention to the observations of 
both technologists and geographers, benefitting from a greater understanding of how a 
confluence of cables and colonies have influenced their historical subjects.  
Seeking to rule rocks rather than people, Britain and America extended their imperial 
legacies well beyond the Cold War. Roberts, Secor and Zook argue that this is even more apparent 
in the American case, speaking of the ‘leaky plumbing’ of global hegemony.’ Composed of 
shipping ports, minerals and industrial sites, global communications infrastructure dominates, 
their analysis with ‘over 70 communications-related locations (landfall for undersea cables, 
satellite ground stations).’117 Cold War collection stations with aerial farms and antennae are 
gradually being replaced by a wider electronic imperialism as communications shift to fibre optic 
cables, running through coral reefs and the deep oceans. But land access on remote islands will 
still be required, suggesting that a technological empire will persist in remote places until this 
physical infrastructure is not longer required.  
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